

WORKSHEET FOR REACTOR AND PLANT SYSTEM DEGRADED CONDITIONS

Reference/Title (LER #, Inspection Report #, etc):	PWR EXAMPLE 2
<p>Factual Description of Identified Condition (statement of <u>facts</u> known about the issue, without hypothetical failures included):</p> <p>During EOP revision, the licensee discovered the RWST level setpoint for ECCS switchover to the containment sump for recirculation did not consider the elevation of the suction piping which terminates 18 inches above the RWST bottom. A DBA LOCA would result in vortexing and loss of pump NPSH prior to the switchover point. The condition has existed since the plant was first operated.</p>	
<p>System(s) and Train(s) with degraded condition: All ECCS equipment and Containment Spray</p>	
<p>Licensing Basis Function (if applicable): Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Building Pressure/Temperature Control.</p>	
<p>Maintenance Rule category (check one): <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> U risk-significant <input type="checkbox"/> non-risk-significant</p> <p>Time degraded condition existed or assumed to exist: > 30 days</p>	
<p>Functions and Cornerstones degraded as a result of this condition (check T)</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>INITIATING EVENT CORNERSTONE</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><input type="checkbox"/> Transient initiator contributor (e.g., reactor/turbine trip, loss offsite power)</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><input type="checkbox"/> Primary or Secondary system LOCA initiator contributor (e.g., RCS or main steam/feedwater pipe degradations and leaks)</p>	
<p><u>MITIGATION CORNERSTONE</u></p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> U Core Decay Heat Removal</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><input type="checkbox"/> Initial injection heat removal paths</p> <p style="padding-left: 80px;"><input type="checkbox"/> Primary (e.g., Safety Inj)</p> <p style="padding-left: 80px;"><input type="checkbox"/> Low Pressure</p> <p style="padding-left: 80px;"><input type="checkbox"/> High Pressure</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><input type="checkbox"/> Secondary - PWR only (e.g., AFW)</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> U Long term heat removal paths (e.g., contmt sump recirculation, suppression pool cooling)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Reactivity control</p>	<p><u>BARRIER CORNERSTONE</u></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> RCS LOCA mitigation boundary degraded (e.g., PORV block valve, PTS issue)</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> U Containment integrity</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><input type="checkbox"/> Breach or bypass</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> U Heat removal, hydrogen or pressure control</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Fuel cladding degraded</p>

PHASE 1 SCREENING PROCESS

Check the appropriate boxes U

Cornerstone(s) assumed degraded:

☐ Initiating Event : Mitigation Systems
 ☐ RCS Barrier
 ☐ Fuel Barrier
 : Containment Barrier

If more than one Cornerstone is degraded, then go to Phase 2. If NO Cornerstone is degraded, then the condition screens OUT as “Green” and is not assessed further by this process.

If only one Cornerstone is degraded, continue in the appropriate column below.

<u>Initiating Event</u>	<u>Mitigation Systems</u>	<u>RCS Barrier</u>	<u>Fuel Barrier</u>	<u>Containment Barrier</u>
1. Does the issue contribute to the likelihood of a Primary or Secondary system LOCA initiator? <input type="radio"/> If YES <input type="radio"/> Go to Phase 2 If NO, continue 2. Does the issue contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip AND the likelihood that mitigation equipment will not be available? <input type="radio"/> If YES <input type="radio"/> Go to Phase 2 <input type="radio"/> If NO, screen OUT	1. Is the issue a design or qualification deficiency that does NOT affect operability per GL 91-18 (rev 1)? <input type="radio"/> If YES <input type="radio"/> Screen OUT If NO, continue 2. Does the issue represent an actual Loss of Safety Function of a System? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> If YES → Go to Phase 2 If NO, continue 3. Does the issue represent an actual Loss of Safety Function of a Single Train, for > TS AOT? <input type="radio"/> If YES <input type="radio"/> Go To Phase 2 If NO, continue 4. Does the issue represent an actual Loss of Safety Function of a Single Train of non-TS equipment designated as risk-significant under 10CFR50.65, for > 24 hrs? <input type="radio"/> If YES <input type="radio"/> Go To Phase 2 <input type="radio"/> If NO, screen OUT	<input type="radio"/> 1. Go to Phase 2	<input type="radio"/> 1. Screen OUT	1. TBD

Result of the Phase 1 screening process: _____ screen OUT as “Green” ☐ U _____ go to Phase 2

Important Assumptions (as applicable): **Low pressure recirculation is unrecoverable during a large LOCA**

Example initiating scenarios to be considered

Affected system	Major Components	Support Systems	Initiating Event Scenarios
AFWS	AFWTDP/Valves Control I&C	125 V-DC 115 V-AC	Transient ¹ , LOOP, MSLB (Outside Cont.), SGTR, SLOCA from PORV/SRV/RCP, MFLB, MSLB (inside Cont.), SLOCA from pipe breaks, ATWS
	AFWMDP Control I&C	4KV bus A&B 125 V-DC, 28 VDC, 115 V-AC, and HVAC	
HHSI & HHSI (Recirc.)	Pumps Valves I&C including DC for 4.16 KV breakers	4.16KV, and 125VDC, 28 VDC, SW, CCW, and HVAC	Transient ¹ , LOOP, MSLB (Outside Cont.), SGTR, SLOCA from PORV/SRV/RCP, MFLB, MSLB (inside Cont.), SLOCA from pipe breaks, ATWS
SI & SI (Recirc.)	Pumps Valves	4.16KV, and 125VDC, 28VDC, SW, CCW, and HVAC	Transient ¹ , LOOP, MSLB (Outside Cont.), SGTR, SLOCA from PORV/SRV/RCP, MFLB, MSLB (inside Cont.), SLOCA from pipe breaks.
LPSI/RHR/ (Recirc.)	Pumps Valves	4.16KV, and 125VDC, 28 VDC, SW, CCW, and HVAC	Transient ¹ , LOOP, MSLB (Outside Cont.), SGTR, SLOCA from PORV/SRV/RCP, MFLB, MSLB (inside Cont.), SLOCA from pipe breaks, M/L LOCA
CS & CS (Recirc.)	Pumps Heat Exch. Valves	4.16 KV, 125 VDC, CCW, 28 VDC, HVAC, SW	Transient ¹ , LOOP, MSLB (Outside Cont.), SGTR, SLOCA from PORV/SRV/RCP, MFLB, MSLB (inside Cont.), SLOCA from pipe breaks, M/L LOCA
EDG	Cooling (unit1 only) HVAC Start system Fuel system	Service Water, 125 VDC, 28 VDC, and HVAC	LOOP
CCW	Pumps Valves Heat Exch.	41.6 KV,125 VDC, 28 VDC, SW for room cooling	Transient ¹ , LOOP, MSLB (Outside Cont.), SGTR, SLOCA from PORV/SRV/RCP, MFLB, MSLB (inside Cont.), SLOCA from pipe breaks, M/L LOCA, ATWS
Service Water	Pumps Valves	4.16 KV, 125 V DC	Transient ¹ , LOOP, MSLB (Outside Cont.), SGTR, SLOCA from PORV/SRV/RCP, MFLB, MSLB (inside Cont.), SLOCA from pipe breaks, M/L LOCA, ATWS
SG PORV	Valves	115 VAC Control Air	Transient ¹ , LOOP, MSLB (Outside Cont.), SGTR, SLOCA from PORV/SRV/RCP, MFLB, MSLB (inside Cont.), SLOCA from pipe breaks, M/L LOCA, ATWS
PORV	Valve	125 VDC 28 VDC and 115 VAC (for Control)	Transient ¹ , LOOP, MSLB (Outside Cont.), SGTR, SLOCA from PORV/SRV/RCP, MFLB, MSLB (inside Cont.), SLOCA from pipe breaks, M/L LOCA, ATWS
Accumulators	Valves	Nitrogen	M/L LOCA

¹Note: Transient scenarios should be developed from those transient initiators that could have the greatest risk significance. For example, develop loss of DC bus transient scenarios for degraded 125v DC or AC power equipment, as well as other transient initiators that may depend on equipment being supplied from degraded power sources. The choice of which transient scenarios to develop should generally be apparent from the specific given condition.

Row	Approx. Freq.	Example Event Type	Estimated Likelihood Rating		
I	>1 per 1 - 10 yr	Reactor Trip Loss of Power Conv. Sys. (loss of condenser, closure of MSIVs, loss of feedwater)	A	B	C
II	1 per 10 - 10 ² yr	Loss of Offsite Power Small LOCA (BWR) (Stuck open SRV only) MSLB (outside cntmt)	B	C	D
III	1 per 10 ² - 10 ³ yr	SGTR Stuck open PORV (PWR) Small LOCA (PWR) (RCP seal failures and stuck open SVs only) MFLB MSLB (inside PWR cntmt)	C	D	E
IV	1 per 10 ³ - 10 ⁴ yr	Small LOCA (pipe breaks) ATWS-PWR (elect only)	D	E	F
V	1 per 10 ⁴ - 10 ⁵ yr	Med LOCA Large LOCA (BWR) ATWS-BWR	E	F	G
VI	<1 per 10 ⁵ yr	Large LOCA (PWR) ATWS-PWR (mech only) ISLOCA Vessel Rupture	F	G	H
			> 30 days	30-3days	<3 days
			Exposure Time for Degraded Condition		

Table 1 - Estimated Likelihood for Initiating Event Occurrence During Degraded Period

PHASE 2 RISK ESTIMATION WORKSHEET

LARGE LOCA

Estimated Frequency (Table 1 Row) VI

Exposure Time > 30 days

Table 1 Result (circle): A B C D E **(F)** G H

Safety Functions Needed:

Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:

Early Inventory (EIAC)

4/4 Accumulators (1 train)

Early Inventory, LP Injection (EILP)

1 / 2 LPSI trains (1 multi-train system)

Low Pressure Recirculation (LPR)

1 / 2 RHR trains with successful switchover to sump (operator action)

Late Containment P/T Control (CNT)

1 / 2 CS trains in Recirculation Mode (1 multi-train system)

Circle Affected Functions

Recovery of Failed Train

Remaining Mitigation Capability Rating for Each Affected Sequence:

Sequence Color

1 LLOCA - EIAC (5)

2 LLOCA - EILP (4)

3 LLOCA - **LPR** (2)

0

(RHR = 0) Total = 0

F0

4 LLOCA - **CNT** (3)

0

(CS = 0) Total = 0

F0

Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:

No Credit for Operator Action

If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.

Remaining Mitigation Capability Rating (with Examples)							
Initiating Event Likelihood	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
	3 diverse trains OR 2 multi-train systems OR 1 train + 1 multi-train system + recovery of failed train	1 train + 1 multi-train system OR 2 diverse trains + recovery of failed train	2 diverse trains OR 1 multi-train system + recovery of failed train	1 train + recovery of failed train OR 1 multi-train system OR Operator action + recovery of failed train	1 train OR Operator action OR Operator action under high stress + recovery of failed train	Recovery of failed train OR Operator action under high stress	none
A	Green	White	Yellow	Red	Red	Red	Red
B	Green	Green	White	Yellow	Red	Red	Red
C	Green	Green	Green	White	Yellow	Red	Red
D	Green	Green	Green	Green	White	Yellow	Red
E	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	White	Yellow
F	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	White
G	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
H	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green

Table 2 - Risk Significance Estimation Matrix (rev 6/10/99)